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expectations equilibria. This paper reports comparable market outcomes when human 
traders are replaced by boundedly-rational algorithmic agents who use a simple means-
end heuristic.  These algorithmic agents lack the capability to optimize; yet outcomes of 
markets populated by them converge near the equilibrium derived from optimization 
assumptions. These findings suggest that market structure is an important determinant of 
efficient aggregate level outcomes, and that care is necessary not to overstate the 
importance of human cognition and conscious optimization in such contexts  
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Our knowledge of the very narrow limits of human rationality must dispose us to 
doubt that business firms, investors or consumers possess either the knowledge or 
computational ability that would be required to carry out the rational 
expectations strategy. 
Herbert Simon (1969) 
 
 
The claim that the market can be trusted to correct the effect of individual 
irrationalities cannot be made without supporting evidence, and the burden of 
specifying a plausible corrective mechanism should rest on those who make this 
claim. 
 Tversky and Kahneman, 1986, p. S275). 
 
 
The principal findings of experimental economics are that impersonal exchange 
in markets converges in repeated interaction to the equilibrium states implied by 
economic theory, under information conditions far weaker than specified in the 
theory. 
Vernon Smith (2008) 
 
1. Introduction 
 A central feature of economic theory is derivation of equilibrium in economies populated 
by agents who maximize some well-ordered function such as profit or utility. Although it is 
recognized that actions of economic agents are subject to institutional constraints and feedback 
(North 1990), exploration of the extent to which equilibrium arises from characteristics of the 
institutional environment, as opposed to the behavior of individuals, has been limited; Becker 
(1962) being a notable exception.  The normal modeling technique is to ascribe sophisticated 
computational abilities to a representative agent to solve for equilibrium (Muth 1961). 
 In Sciences of the Artificial, Simon (1969, Chapter 3) questioned the plausibility of 
human agents, with their limited cognitive abilities, forming rational expectations by intuition. 
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Accumulated observational evidence on these cognitive limits of individuals shifted the burden 
of proof, and led to calls for evidence that markets can overcome such behavioral limitations 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1986 quoted above; Thaler 1986).   
 Laboratory studies of markets populated by asymmetrically-informed profit-motivated 
human subjects have revealed that their aggregate level outcomes tend to converge near the 
predictions of rational expectations theory (Forsythe, Palfrey and Plott 1982; Plott and Sunder 
1982—henceforth PS, 1988; and Forsythe and Lundholm 1990). However, since complex 
patterns of human behavior can only be inferred from actions, not observed directly, it is difficult 
to know from such experiments which elements of trader behavior and faculties are necessary or 
sufficient for various kinds of markets to attain their theoretical equilibria. This difficulty has led 
some to claim that inability of human beings to optimize by intuition implies that economic 
theories based on optimization assumptions are prima facie invalid (Tversky and Kahneman 
1986).  
 Such doubts about the achievability of mathematically derived equilibria, when 
individual agents are not able to perform complex optimization calculations, are understandable. 
From a constructivist point of view (Smith 2008), rational expectations equilibria place heavy 
demands on individual cognition to learn others’ preferences or strategies, and to arrive at 
unbiased estimates of underlying parameters of the economy by observing market variables. In 
theory, disseminating and detecting information in markets calls for bootstrapping—rational 
assessments are necessary to arrive in equilibrium and such assessments require observation of 
equilibrium outcomes. Cognitive and computational demands on individuals to arrive at 
economic equilibria, especially rational expectations equilibria, are quite high, generating 
questions about the plausibility of equilibrium models (Simon 1969).  
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 Replacing humans by simple algorithms can allow us to decompose the complexity of 
trader behavior into simpler elements, and establish causal links between specific characteristics 
of trader behavior and market outcomes. Using the Gode and Sunder (1993) approach, we find 
and report that in markets with uncertainty and asymmetric information, simple zero-intelligence 
adaptive algorithmic traders are able to attain outcomes approximating rational expectations 
equilibria. Since the statistical distribution of these outcomes is centered near the PS 
observations of markets with human traders, the convergence of their outcomes to equilibrium 
can be attributed to the minimal levels of intelligence with which the algorithms are endowed. 
Since this level of intelligence is far less than what is assumed in deriving equilibria, it is 
reasonable to infer that the convergence of markets to rational expectations equilibria emerge 
mainly from the properties of the market and simple and plausible decision heuristics, rather than 
from complex and sophisticated optimization (Becker 1962, Gigerenzer et al., 1999, and Smith 
2008).    
 
1.1 Background 
 Economic theory is commonly understood to require individual agents to have 
sophisticated information processing capabilities and maximization objectives. However an 
alternative conceptualization of how equilibria are attained is that market structure generates 
constraints which guide human behavior without making extensive computational demands on 
individual problem solving. This conceptualization of structure builds on the work of Becker 
(1962), Smith (1962) and Gode and Sunder (1993). Becker (1962) showed that the downward 
slope of demand and the upward slope of supply functions arise from individuals having to act 
within their budget constraints, even if they choose randomly from their opportunity sets. Smith 
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(1962) reported that classroom double auction markets populated by a mere handful of profit-
motivated student traders with minimal information arrive in close proximity of Walrasian 
equilibrium. Moreover, Smith’s auction markets had little resemblance to the tâtonnement story 
used to motivate theoretical derivations.  
 Gode and Sunder (1993) put Becker’s constrained random choice together with Smith’s 
double auctions and reported the results of computer simulations of simple double auctions 
populated by ZI (for “zero intelligence”) algorithmic traders who bid or ask randomly within 
their budget constraints (i.e., buyers do not bid above their private values and sellers do not ask 
below their private costs). Although these traders do not remember, optimize, seek higher profits, 
or learn, simulated markets populated by such traders also reach the proximity of their theoretical 
equilibria, especially in their allocative efficiency. In simple double auctions without uncertainty 
or information asymmetry, theoretical equilibria are attainable with individuals endowed with 
only minimal levels of intelligence (not trading at a loss). Jamal and Sunder (1996) extended the 
results to markets with shared uncertainty with algorithmic agents using means-end heuristic 
(henceforth M-E,) developed by Newell and Simon (1972).  
 PS found that markets with uncertainty and asymmetrically distributed information (with 
two or three states of the world) disseminate information and converge near rational expectations 
equilibria when populated with profit-motivated human traders. The present paper examines 
whether the PS results can also be achieved without profit maximization on the part of traders.  
Do minimally intelligent traders using the M-E heuristic also yield market outcomes predicted by 
rational expectations? 
 Substitution of human subjects of traditional laboratory markets by algorithmic agents 
using M-E heuristic has the advantage of helping us gain precise control of traders’ information 
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processing and decision making (i.e., “cognitive”) abilities and process. This control allows us to 
hold trader “cognition” constant at a specified level and explore the outcome properties of 
market structures and environment. In contrast, we can neither observe nor hold invariant the 
cognitive processes used by human traders (also, see Angerer et al. 2011; and Huber et al. 2010, 
2011). Moreover, use of algorithmic traders enables us to run longer computational experiments, 
randomize parameters in the experimental setting, and conduct replications without significant 
additional cost in time or money.   
The paper is organized in four sections. The second section describes a simple M-E heuristic 
used by minimally-intelligent algorithmic traders in a double auction market.  In the third 
section, we implement this heuristic in a market where some traders have perfect insider 
information (while others have no information) and compare the simulation results with data 
from the profit-motivated human experiments reported by PS.  The fourth section presents the 
implications of the findings and some concluding remarks.  
2. Means-End Heuristic 
Simon (1955) proposed bounded rationality as a process model to understand and explain how 
humans, with their limited knowledge and computational capacity behave in complex settings.  
He postulated that humans develop and use simple heuristics to seek and attain merely 
satisfactory, not optimal, outcomes. To understand human problem-solving Newell, Shaw and 
Simon (1957) developed General Problem Solver (GPS).  Newell and Simon (1972) adduced a 
large body of data which show that GPS is a robust model of human problem-solving in a wide 
variety of task environments.  The key heuristic used by GPS is means-ends analysis (M-E or the 
heuristic of reducing differences). Gigerenzer et al. (1999) have focused on the usefulness and 
effectiveness of fast and frugal heuristics like M-E in human life, whereas Tversky and 
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Kahneman (1974) have documented a similar heuristic which they relabeled as “anchor and 
adjust.”  GPS recognizes knowledge states, differences between knowledge states, 
operators, goals, sub-goals and problem solving heuristics as entities. GPS starts with an initial 
(or current) knowledge state, and a goal or desired knowledge state. GPS then selects and applies 
operators that reduce the difference between the current state and the goal state.  The M-E 
heuristic for carrying out this procedure can be summarized in four steps: (i) compare the current 
knowledge state a with a goal state b to identify difference d between them; (ii) find an operator 
o that will reduce the difference d in the next step; (iii) apply the operator o to the current 
knowledge state a to produce a new current knowledge state a* that is closer to b than a ; and (iv) 
repeat this process until the current knowledge state a* is acceptably close to the goal state b. 
Knowledge states of traders can be represented as aspiration levels (Simon 1956) that adjust in 
response to experience.  The M-E heuristic for a trader thus requires a mechanism for setting an 
initial aspiration level, and a method for adjusting these levels in light of experience (e.g., Jamal 
and Sunder 1996).  
2.1 Market Environment 
 Market environment is defined by four elements: (1) uncertainty, (2) distribution of 
information, (3) security payoffs, and (4) rules of the market. Following PS we examine markets 
with either two (X and Y) or three (X, Y, and Z) states of the world, where each state si occurs 
with a known probability πi. One half of the traders in the markets are informed about the 
realized state of the world before the trading starts each period, while the other half are 
uninformed.  At the beginning of each period, each trader is endowed with two identical 
securities which pay a single state contingent dividend DXj  at the end of the trading period. 
There are three types of traders and each trader type gets a different dividend in a given state 
8 
 
(e.g., state x - see Table 1). The rules of the double auction are as follows: after a bid or ask is 
generated (see section 2.3 for details on bid/ask generation), the highest bid price is compared to 
the lowest ask price.  If the bid price is equal to or greater than the ask price a trade occurs.  The 
recorded transaction price is set to be equal to the midpoint between the bid and ask prices.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.2 Implementing M-E Heuristic 
We implement the M-E heuristic in two steps. First, each agent’s initial knowledge state 
(aspiration level) is set equal to the expected value of the payoff based on its private information. 
The second step implements the idea that subjects without perfect information make gradual 
adjustments by applying weight γ (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) to newest observed price Pt, and weight (1- γ ) to 
the past Current Aspiration Level (CALt). This process can be represented as a first order 
adaptive process: 
CALt+1 = (1 - γ) CALt   + γ Pt.    (1) 
If CAL0 is the initial value of CALt, by substitution,  
CALt+1 = (1 - γ)
t+1 CAL0   + γ ((1 - γ)
tP1 + (1 - γ)
t-1 P2 + … + (1 - γ) Pt-1 + Pt). (2) 
  In the context of double auction markets, these two elements of the M-E heuristic—
setting an initial aspiration level and gradually adapting it in light of  observed transaction 
prices—can be interpreted in appropriate ways. We describe the structure of each market, the 
implementation of the heuristic in that market, followed by an examination of the simulation 
outcomes, and a comparison of these outcomes with the previously reported results obtained in 
laboratory experiments with profit-motivated human subjects. 
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2.3 Minimally Intelligent Algorithmic Agents 
Algorithmic agents deployed in these markets use an M-E heuristic to estimate a “current 
aspiration level” (CAL), and use the CAL to implement a Zero-Intelligence (ZI) strategy after 
Gode and Sunder (1993) consisting of bidding randomly below and asking above their aspiration 
levels.  Traders draw a uniformly distributed random number between 0 and an upper limit of 1. 
If number drawn is less than or equal to 0.5, the trader will generate a bid.  If the number drawn 
is greater than 0.5, an ask will be generated.  If the action is a bid, then the amount of the bid is 
determined by drawing a second randomly generated number between a lower bound of 0 and an 
upper bound of the individual trader’s CAL.  This bid is then compared to the highest bid that 
currently exists in the market.  If the new bid is higher than the existing highest bid, the new bid 
becomes the new highest bid in the market.  Correspondingly, if the action is an ask, then the 
amount of the ask is determined by generating a second random number in the range having a 
lower bound of the traders CAL and an upper bound of 1.  This newly generated ask is then 
compared to the existing lowest ask in the market.  If the new ask is less than the existing ask, 
then the new ask becomes the new lowest ask in the market.   Bids and asks are generated 
randomly, distributed independently, identically, and uniformly over these ranges (see Figure 1). 
These algorithmic agents are myopic, making no attempt to anticipate, backward induct, or 
theorize about the behavior of other traders. They simply use the knowledge of observable past 
market events (transaction prices) to estimate their opportunity sets, and choose randomly from 
these sets.  
Insert figure 1 about here 
These markets are populated in equal numbers by traders of each payoff type who are, 
and are not, informed about the realized state of world. As shown in Figure 2, the informed 
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algorithmic traders begin by setting their initial CAL using the perfect signal they have about the 
realized state of the world for any given trader type j: 
If realized state = X, CALX= DXj 
If realized state = Y, CALY = DYj   (3)
1
 
  The uninformed traders of type j use their unconditional expected dividend value to set 
their initial CAL using the prior state probabilities:  
CALj = Pr(X) * (DXj)  + Pr(Y) * (DYj)    (4)2 
 Since they know the state with certainty, informed traders do not update their CALs in 
response to observed transactions; they learn nothing about the state of the world from 
transaction prices.3  Uninformed traders of every dividend type, however, update their CALs after 
each transaction using the M-E heuristic (i.e., first order adaptive process):  
CAL t+1 = (1-) (CAL t) + ( Pt),  (5) 
with a given randomly chosen value of the adaptive parameter   for the simulation (see Section 
2.4 below).  Submission of bids and asks continues with the updated CALs serving as constraints 
on the opportunity sets of traders until the next transaction occurs, and this process is repeated 
for 10,000 cycles to the end of the period.  At the end of each period the realized state is revealed 
to all traders, dividends are paid to their accounts, and each trader’s security endowment is 
refreshed for the following period.  The uninformed algorithmic traders carry their end-of-period 
CAL forward and use it in the following period.4  
                                                          
1 For 3-state markets, if realized state = Z, CALY = DZj. 
2 For 3-state markets, CALj = Pr(X)*(DXj) +Pr(Y)*(DYj)+Pr(X)*(DZj). 
3 The informed traders could, for example, learn that in some states market prices are higher than their own dividend 
in that state, and thus raised their CAL to that higher level. Human traders, presumably, make this adjustment but our 
algorithmic traders do not. We should not, therefore, expect the markets with these minimally-intelligent agents to 
behave identically to the human markets.  
4  At this stage, it would have been possible for the agents to keep track of the prices associated with each realized 




 In the following period, informed traders again get a perfect signal about the state and set 
their CAL = DXj (or DYj ) depending on whether the signal received is X or Y.  The uninformed 
traders use their end-of-period CAL from the preceding period as CAL0 to trade and to generate 
CAL1 after the first transaction, and so on.  This process is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
2.4 Experimental Design 
  We use the market design parameters from the PS human experiments for our 
simulations (see Table 1).  We ran 50 replications of four markets numbered 2, 3, 4 and 5 as 
reported by PS’s human experiments (three states in Market 5, and two in the other three 
markets).5 The participants were freshly endowed with two securities every period.  For each of 
the 50 replications, the adjustment parameter γ was randomly and independently drawn from a 
uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.5). In each market, there are 12 traders who traded single period 
securities.  A random state of nature—X, Y, (or Z in case of 3-states)—was drawn at the start of 
each period to match the actual realizations observed in the PS markets. Except for a few initial 
periods (when no trader was informed), and in some final periods (when all traders were 
informed), six of these twelve traders had perfect inside information and the other six were 
uninformed. For consistency and ease of reference we identify these markets using the same 
numbers as used by PS.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and uninformed agents simply carry forward their CAL from the end of one period to the beginning of the next 
period. The CAL of informed agents responds to a perfect signal about the state realized in each period and is not 
dependent on experience in previous periods. 
5 PS found that the information structure of their Market 1 was too complex for it to reach rational expectations 
equilibrium in less than a dozen periods. Accordingly, we have not tried to replicate that market in these simulations. 
6 In this paper we only report periods where one half of the traders in the market are informed and the other half are 
uninformed.  We have also simulated periods where all traders were informed, or all were uninformed.  The results 
are not qualitatively different from human participants reported in PS.  Full simulation results, including all periods 




In addition to the design parameters, Table 1 also shows the respective equilibrium 
predictions of prices and allocations of the four markets. These markets were designed by PS 
such that the price predictions of both the rational expectations and the Walrasian or prior 
information (PI) equilibria in the high price states (state X in Markets 2, 3, and 4; states X and Y 
in Market 5) are identical. However, in the low-price state (Y in Markets 2, 3, and 4; Z in Market 
5), the price predictions of the two equilibrium models are distinct. Also, as shown in Table 1, 
the allocation predictions overlap partially in the high-price state(s) but are distinct in the low 
price state. These differences in equilibrium predictions allowed PS to conclude that behavior of 
their human participants was better explained by the RE equilibria than the competing PI model. 
3. Experimental Results – Markets with Asymmetric Insider Information 
  Figure 3, Panel A shows the time chart of prices observed in five asymmetric information 
periods of a market populated with profit-motivated human traders reported in PS against the 
background of rational expectations (RE - solid  horizontal line) and Walrasian (PI - broken 
horizontal line) predictions for respective periods .  Panel B shows a time chart of prices from 50 
replications and their median (in solid black line) of the same market with M-E heuristic 
algorithmic traders. The adaptive parameter γ is randomly and independently drawn each period 
from a uniform distribution U(0.05, 0.5) and the same value is applicable to all traders.  Six of 
the twelve traders have perfect inside information and the other six are uninformed. Allocative 
efficiency and trading volume is shown numerically for each period in Panel A of Table 2. 
  Panels A and B in Figure 3 indicate: (1) In state X (with low RE price of 0.24), 
transaction prices of both human traders (Panel A) and algorithmic traders (Panel B) approach 
the RE equilibrium level from above. (2) In state Y (with higher RE price of 0.35), transaction 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the code, and allows visitors to rerun simulations with their own random seeds, and see the charts of market 
behavior dynamically, as well as obtain data files for further analysis.  
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prices of both human traders (Panel A) and algorithmic traders (Panel B) generally approach and 
get close to the equilibrium level from below. (3) As shown in Table 2, in State X (low RE price) 
periods, average trading volume for human traders across the five periods is 19.5 while the 
average volume for algorithmic traders is 17.5. The allocative efficiency of human trader 
markets across the five periods is 64%, while efficiency of the simulated markets is 81%. Note 
that allocative efficiency occurs from having the appropriate number of trades and the securities 
being acquired by the appropriate type of trader.  These efficiency levels (bellow 100) suggest 
the wrong type of trader is accumulating securities in some periods.  In State Y (low RE price) 
periods, human traders’ average volume is 19.3 (vs. 23.7 for algorithmic traders) and human 
trader efficiency is 100%, while algorithmic traders achieve efficiency levels of 99%.   This 
means the appropriate number of trades is taking place, and securities are being held by the 
appropriate trader type. 
 There are also important differences between the two panels: (1) convergence of prices to 
RE predictions in Panel A (with  human traders) is tighter and progressively faster in later 
periods, as compared to Panel B where there is little change from early to later realizations of the 
same state (X or Y).  Efficiency results also show human subjects improving over time (when 
State is X), whereas markets populated with algorithmic traders show less improvement over 
time. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 and Table 2 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Replication of the 2-state markets with different parameters (Figures 4 and 5 and Table 2) 
show essentially the same pattern of convergence except that in State Y (low RE price) human 
traders have a tendency to converge quickly to the RE price, especially in later periods (not 
coming from above or below) whereas the paths with algorithmic traders depend on history in 
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the previous period (because the CAL from the uninformed is carried forward from previous 
periods). If the previous period is State X (high RE price) the simulation converges from above, 
and if the previous period is State Y (low RE price), the simulation converges from below the RE 
price. As expected, algorithmic traders adjust slowly and learn myopically without any global 
awareness of equilibrium prices. 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figures 4 and 5 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Figure 6, Panel A displays data for a three-state market reported by PS with human 
traders, and identical market replicated for this paper with algorithmic traders. Figure 6, Panel B 
shows a chart of median prices from 50 replications of the same market with minimally 
intelligent M-E algorithmic traders. In both panels, the solid horizontal line indicates the rational 
expectations (dashed for PI) equilibrium price for the respective periods. Allocative efficiency 
and trading volume are shown numerically for each period in Table 2 Panel D, the average 
efficiency and volume (across 50 replications) are shown numerically.  
  Figure 6 indicates: (1) In state Z (with high RE price of 0.32), for both human (Panel A) 
and algorithmic traders (Panel B) transaction prices approach and get close to the RE equilibrium 
level from below. (2) In state Y (with medium RE price of 0.245), transaction prices also 
generally approach and get close to the equilibrium level from below in both panels. The only 
exception occurs in Period 11 when the market converges from above in both human and 
simulated markets.  It appears that moving from a high equilibrium price state to a lower price 
state may cause convergences from above.  Otherwise, both humans and our simulated traders 
tend to be conservative and approach the equilibrium price from below. ((3) Trading volume in 
all three states is generally greater than the predicted volume of 16 trades. For human traders 
volume tends to range from 15-23 trades, whereas algorithmic traders volume ranges from 14-24 
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trades. (5) In all periods of State Z (high RE price), allocative efficiency for human traders is 
100% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 99% efficiency.  In State Y (medium RE price) 
periods, allocative efficiency of human traders averages 97% (100% efficiency in all periods 
except the first realization of State Y) whereas algorithmic traders achieve 95% efficiency and do 
not achieve 100% efficiency in any individual period. In State X (low RE price) periods, 
allocative efficiency of human traders averages 88% whereas algorithmic traders achieve 92% 
efficiency.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2 shows volume and efficiency numerically. Again, it is clear that, outcomes of 
markets with profit-motivated human and minimally intelligent algorithmic traders exhibit the 
same central tendencies of convergence towards the predictions of rational expectations models. 
Apparently, the structural constraints of the market rules, and simple means-end heuristics 
proposed by Newell and Simon (1972) are sufficient to yield this result even as the number of 
states in the market increases from 2 states to 3.  
3.1 Statistical Analysis of Price Changes, Volume and Efficiency 
To assess price convergence to the rational expectations equilibrium, we report results of 
a procedure used by Gode and Sunder (1993) who regressed the root mean squared deviation 
between transaction and RE equilibrium prices on the natural logarithm of the transaction 
sequence number within a period. If prices move towards RE levels over time, the slope 
coefficient of this regression should be less than zero. Four panels of Figure 7 show the behavior 
of this root mean square deviation over time for the four human and simulated market pairs. 
Results of ordinary least squares regressions of MSD on log of transaction sequence number in  
human and simulated markets are shown in two triplets in each panel (slope, p-value, and R2) 
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respectively. Three of the four human (with the exception of Market 2), as well as all four 
simulated markets exhibit significant convergence to RE equilibrium, and the zero-slope 
hypothesis is rejected in favor of negative slope alternative at p < 0.000 for the seven markets.  
Explanatory power is generally high with 80% of the reduction in the deviation from RE 
equilibria being explained by log of transaction sequence number. Figure 7 shows that root mean 
squared deviation of transaction from RE equilibrium prices tends towards 0.  
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 7 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 Across all 32 periods of the four markets, the difference between the trading volume 
(Figure 8) and efficiency (Figure 9) of human and simulated markets is not statistically different 
(average volume of simulated market is about one trade greater than for human markets with t-
statistic of 1.35 and the average efficiency of simulated markets is 1.6% lower than that of 
markets with human traders (t-statistic of -1.08). There is no significant difference between the 
volumes and efficiency of markets with human traders as opposed to algorithmic traders. The 
inference is not that these simple algorithms capture all or even most of the behavior of the 
humans; that is not true. However, when seen through the perspective of aggregate market 
outcomes—prices, allocations, trading volume, and efficiency—these differences get attenuated 
to a point of statistical insignificance.   
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Figure 8 and 9 about Here 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
4. Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
We have presented evidence that individual behavior, modeled by simple means-end heuristics 
and zero-intelligence, yields near-equilibrium market outcomes whose formal derivation requires 
strong assumptions about optimization by individual agents. Even if this key assumption of 
17 
 
theory is descriptively invalid, it does not necessarily undermine the validity and predictive value 
of the theory at the aggregate level. Our findings are consistent with Gigerenzer et al. (1999) who 
built on Simon’s bounded rationality paradigm by proposing that individuals use “fast and 
frugal” heuristics to successfully accomplish complex tasks. 
The computational or other “cognitive” abilities of our algorithmic traders do not exceed, indeed 
are far weaker than, the documented faculties of human cognition. Yet, these simulated markets 
with insider trading based on asymmetric access to information converge to the close proximity 
of rational expectations equilibria and attain high allocative efficiency. Contrary to claims made 
in behavioral economics literature (e.g., Tversky and Kahneman 1974, Thaler 1986), we find that 
individuals using a simple means-end heuristic (analogous to Tversky and Kahneman’s 1974 
anchor and adjust heuristic) in a market setting generate outcomes close to the rational 
expectations equilibrium. We interpret the results to suggest that, even in these relatively 
complex market environments (compared to Gode and Sunder 1993, 1997, and Jamal and Sunder 
1996), allocative efficiency of markets remains largely a function of their structure, not 
intelligence or optimizing behavior of agents.  Stress on understanding the role of market 
structure, rather than human cognition, may help advance our understanding of links between 
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Table 1 – Simulation Parameters 
  







            Type I  Type II  Type III   (Allocation to)*  (Allocation to)* 





X  0.333 0.1 0.2 0.24 0.24(III) 0.266(Iu)
Y  0.667 0.35 0.3 0.175 0.35(I) 0.35(Ii)





X  0.4 0.4 0.3 0.125 0.4(I) 0.4(Ii)
Y  0.6 0.1 0.15 0.175 0.175(III) 0.22(Iu)





X  0.4 0.375 0.275 0.1 0.375(I) 0.375(Ii)
Y  0.6 0.1 0.15 0.175 0.175(III) 0.21(Iu)







X  0.35 0.12 0.155 0.18 0.18(III) 0.212(Iu)
Y  0.25 0.17 0.245 0.1 0.245(II) 0.245(IIi)
Z  0.4 0.32 0.135 0.16 0.32(I) 0.32(Ii)













Table 2: Transaction and Efficiency Data 
Panel A - Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 2 




























Panel B – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 3 








































 Panel C – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 4 












































Panel D – Number of Transactions (Efficiency Levels) of Market 5 

















































Plott and Sunder (1982) conducted an experiment with profit oriented human traders to ascertain whether they traded at prices (and quantities) 
predicted by rational expectations models. Table 2 shows the number of transactions and efficiency levels attained by human traders, as well as 
simulated algorithmic traders who use a simple linear heuristic to update aspiration levels. The behavior of simulated traders is qualitatively 











The algorithmic traders in our simulated markets send a message by first drawing a random number from a uniform 
distribution bounded by 0 and 1. If the number is less than or equal (greater than) to 0.5, the message is a bid (ask).  If the 
message is a bid, the trader draws a second random number from a uniform distribution bounded by 0 and the current 
aspiration level (CAL).  If the message is an ask, the second random number is drawn from a uniform distribution between 
CAL and 1.  If the trader’s bid is more than the highest current bid in the market, the former becomes the current bid. If the 
trader’s ask is less than the current (lowest) ask, then the former becomes the current ask in the market. When the market 
bid is equal to (or exceeds) the market ask, a trade occurs at the mid-point of the bid and ask. Visit www.zitraders.com for 












*There are two types of traders in our simulated markets--informed and uniformed. They set a current aspiration level 
(CAL) to generate bids and asks. The informed (insider) traders get a perfect signal about the realized state and set their 
CAL = their dividend in that state. The uninformed traders set their CAL= expected value, and then update it using a simple 
linear updating rule after each transaction. The end-of-period CAL of uninformed traders is carried forward to the next 






Figure 3 plots the price paths for periods 7-11 of Market 2 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets.  Panel A provides the 
price history observed using human participants in PS.  Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation using algorithmic traders.  In both 
panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior information (PI) predicted price.  Each dot in Panel B 
is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.  The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases 
over time.  
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Panel A - Human Data
0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30 0 10 20 30





Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.24 (0.266), State Y = 0.35 (0.35)




Figure 4 plots the price paths for periods 3-10 of Market 3 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets.  Panel 
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS.  Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation 
using algorithmic traders.  In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior 
information (PI) predicted price.  Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.  
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time.  
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Panel A - Human Data
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Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.4 (0.4), State Y = 0.175 (0.22)




Figure 5 plots the price paths for periods 5-13 of Market 4 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets.  Panel 
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS.  Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation 
using algorithmic traders.  In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior 
information (PI) predicted price.  Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.  
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time. 
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Panel A - Human Data
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Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.375 (0.375), State Y = 0.175 (0.21)




Figure 6 plots the price paths for periods 4-13 of Market 5 in Plott and Sunder (1982) where participants have different information sets.  Panel 
A provides the price history observed using human participants in PS.  Panel B provides data from 50 replications of a computer simulation 
using algorithmic traders.  In both panels the solid grey line is the rational expectations (RE) predicted price while the dashed line is the prior 
information (PI) predicted price.  Each dot in Panel B is an observed price and the dark line is the median price observed over 50 replications.  
The price cloud (of dots) shows the range of prices and how it decreases over time. 
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Panel A - Human Data
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Panel B - Simulation Data (50 Replications and Median)
RE (PI) Eq. Prices are State X = 0.18 (0.212), State Y = 0.245 (0.245), State Z = 0.32 (0.32)




Figure 7: Root Mean Squared Deviation of Prices from Equilibrium vs. Transaction Number
 
To assess price convergence over time towards the rational expectations price, Figure 7 plots the root mean square deviation of prices from the 
rational expectations equilibrium by transaction number for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and the algorithmic traders in our 
simulation.  For both human and simulated traders the root mean square price deviation tends towards zero. For human Market 4, the first five 
root mean squared deviation observations are more than 0.02 for a maximum of 0.145 for transaction 3, and do not appear in the chart. The y-
scale is chosen to highlight the relationships for the remaining data.  OLS regression (MSD = α + β ln transaction No.) estimates of β, p-value 
and R2 for human and algorithmic markets are shown numerically inside each chart.  For example, the human participants in market 5 have the 
following values:  β = -0.00082, p-value = 0.000 and R2 = 0.90.  These results show that observed prices are converging towards the RE 
equilibrium price in all markets except for human participants in Market 2. 
Humans: (-0.00003, 0.926, 0.00)
Algorithms: (-0.00181, 0.000, 0.92)
Humans: (-0.00187, 0.000, 0.87)
Algorithms: (-0.00433, 0.000, 0.94)
Humans: (-0.00752, 0.000, 0.69)
Algorithms: (-0.00426, 0.000, 0.91)
Humans: (-0.00082, 0.000, 0.90)
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Figure 8: Comparison of Transaction Volume by Market and Period 
 
Figure 8 provides a comparison of the number of transactions for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and our algorithm traders.  
The mean volume for human traders is 17.81 over 32 periods.  The mean volume for the algorithmic traders is 18.78 over 32 periods.  Overall 
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Figure 9: Comparison of Efficiency by Market and Period 
 
 Figure 9 provides a comparison of market efficiency for both the Plott and Sunder (1982) human traders and our algorithm traders.  The mean 
efficiency for human traders is 93.69% over 32 periods.  The mean efficiency for the algorithmic traders is 92.06%.  Overall the mean 
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